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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
I OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
1 BRUCE 'r. WORTHEN, ) 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SHURTLEFF and ANDREWS, INC., 
t
. , 
1 a rorpora ion, \ 
Def end ant, \ 
VS. 
, THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, 
Surcessor of The Commission of 
Finance, Administrator of The 
State Insurance Fund, 
Intervenor and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10651 
Petition for Rehearing 
Intervenor and Appellant respectfully petitions the 
Court for Rehearing in the above entitled case for the 
rea~ou that the holding of the Court failed to consider 
material issues that should have been decided. 
Dated this 28th day of April, 1967. 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
Attorney for Intervenor 
amd Appella;n.t 
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Brief in Support of 
Petition for Rehearing 
It appears clear that the effect of the majol'ity 
decision in this case was to overrule the prior lltah (·;1;;r, 
of McConnell v. Commission of Finance, 13 U.2d ~~J.J, 
375 P.2d 394. This Court stated "we hm·e so conelndL•rl 
cognizant of McConnell, 13 U .2d 395, 375 P.2d 3D+, i11 
which the insurance carrier was not made a part>•, hut 
insofar as this case may be inco11siste11t with l\lcConuell, 
that case is overruled." It should be note<l that i11 drafl-
ing the Stipulation which was entered into lJy the partirs 
at the District Court level, that the parties strn1ionsl)· srt 
forth the same fact situation as was present in the :Jk 
Connell case. It is respectfully suggested, thereforr, that 
no distinctions can be made between the McConnell rase 
and the present decision of this Court. 
The purpose of this Petition is not to rel1Clsh the 
arguments heretofore submitted by the parties, but 
rather to ask for an amplification of certain problems 
that are presented by the overruling of the :l\IcConncll 
case. It is, ho\vever, respectfully urged that the abon 
entitled case is in error. The Intenenor and Appellant 
calls attention to 2 Darson Workman's Compe11satio11 
Law (1961), Sec. 74.32 which points out that the :\Ic-
Connell case sustains the majority of holdings of c:i;;tel' 
states in regard to the problem of distrilmtio11 of tl1 1• 
proceeds of a third party actio11. 
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rr1w i11itial problem presented is the effect of the 
language of the McConnell case, wherein the Court dis-
rnsscd sub-section 2 of 35-1-62 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, 
which provides, in part, as follows : " ... ( 2) the person 
liabh, for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payment made.'' The Court concluded as 
follows: 
"Furthermore, subsection (2) requires that the 
insurance carrier be reimbursed in full, providing, 
of course, the amount of recovery is sufficient to 
do so after payment of the legal expenses, includ-
ing attorney's fees. If plaintiff were right in his 
contention that an insurance carrier is liable for 
its proportionate share of the costs and fees, then 
an insurance carrier would never be reimbursed in 
full." (Emphasis supplied in Court opinion) 
Based upon this language, it was felt that the State 
Insnrace Fund has a statutory right to reimbursement, 
in full, when the amount recovered is sufficient to pay 
legal expenses, and also to provide for total reimburse-
mrnt. 'l'herefore, it appeared clear that the Department 
of Finance did not have authority to compromise sub-
rogation claims against third parties. It is respectfully 
submitted that the present case leaves open this question 
hy its effect of overruling the l\icConnell case in total. 
T!w State Insurance Fund is frankly at a loss in now 
r1etermining whether or not it has authority to com-
promise claims \Vhieh may be beneficial to its interest in 
a third party law suit. This issue is not academic in light 
of an opinion given by the Attorney General on the 3rd 
rlay of l\Iarch, 1965 ( Opi11io11 No. 65-015) wherein the 
A ttorne~· General, relying m part upon the McConnell 
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case, states that the Department of Finallce clues not 
have authority to compromise subrogation claims and 
holds that in the situation \Yhere there are sufficient 
funds for the Insurance Fund to be paid in full, that 
they have no authority to make such compromise. 111 
fact, the Attorne~v General adYised that since tl1e fuuds 
of the State Insurance Fund are not public· fm11Ls, lint 
rather trust funds, that "those administering the FuuJ 
might well be held liable personally for the amount <'Om-
promised. '' It is, therefore, requested that this Petition 
be granted in order that the question of whethrr or 11ot 
the Director of Finance may compromise suhrngation 
claims against third parties may be answered. 
The Court, in its majority decision in this case, is 
helpful in settling the issue of the question of the reason-
ableness of attorney fees by holding that the Trial Comt, 
in this particular case, approved the contingent foe a~ 
being reasonable. We respectfully suggest, l10wever, that 
there are additional unanswered questions that should 
be resolved. For example, based upon the McConnell 
case attorneys have paid, in many instances, the pro-
portionate fee chargable to the Insurance Fund under 
protest. The question presented then is whether or not 
the Fund is required to refund the fees thus paid Hince 
the 1\IcConnell case. Secondly, agreements with counsel 
have been reached based upon the 1\IcCmmell case \Yhich 
are now pending. The issue presented, therefore, is 
whether or not the Fund is liable for such fees r-;inc<' i11 
its agreement with counsel it made particular reforeJJ('C' 
to the McConnell case. 
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Another issue which has been presented since the 
Worthen case has been decided, is whether or not the 
Insurance Fund is liable for the payment of attorney 
fees based upon the total award made to an applicant or 
rather a percentage based upon what has actually been 
paid to an aplicant. For example, a widow may have re-
~eivcd an award of Sixteen-Thousand Dollars ($16,000) 
11hich is to be paid over a number of years. At the time 
of the settlement, pursuant to the provisions of the 
award, only Ten-Thousand Dollars ($10,000) has been 
paid. The question presented, therefore, is whether or 
not the Insurance Fund is liable for twenty-five percent 
(25'/o) of the Ten-Thousand Dollars or twenty-five per-
cent of the Sixteen-Thousand Dollars. 
The Intervenor and Appellant recognize that this 
Co mt is not inclined, and rightly so, to set forth decisions 
in the nature of a declaratory decision. It is the position 
of Intervenor and Appellant, however, that when certain 
consequences naturally flow from a decision that is sub-
seqeuntly over-ruled, that this request is not improper 
in order to avoid superfluous litigation. Therefore, 
Intervenor and Appellant respectfully asks direction 
from the Court in light of the holding of this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. MOORE 
422 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Intervenor 
and Appellant 
5 
